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ATTICUS FINCH, IN CONTEXT
Randolph N. Stone*
One summer night in 1955, Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old
Chicago boy visiting relatives in Mississippi, was abducted by two
white men, beaten, and shot; his body was tied to a fan from a cotton gin and thrown in a river.' Emmett's "crime": being black and
allegedly whistling at a white woman. 2 Through the early 1970s,
hundreds of black men had been "legally" executed after being convicted, usually by all white juries or white judges, of sexually
assaulting white women;3 hundreds more were lynched and otherwise extrajudicially executed. 4 This is the historical context of
white supremacy essentially ignored by Professor Lubet in his cleverly written critique of Atticus Finch.
Lubet's review contains a number of other discrepancies and
flaws, but space limits my discussion to the most obvious. First,
despite Lubet's repeated assertions, Tom Robinson's defense to the
rape charge was never consent. 5 The consent defense admits sexual
intercourse but denies the use of force. Even if true, such a defense
was not a practical alternative for a black man accused of raping a
white woman in 1930s Alabama or anywhere else in the United
States. In fact, Robinson's defense was that no sexual intercourse
of any kind had occurred, that the charge of rape was a lie.6
The importance of understanding the defense is critical to
debunking Lubet's next exaggeration: that Mayella Ewell was "tortured" on the witness stand by Atticus Finch.7 I suppose the term
torture is needed to justify the shaky premises supporting the thin
theoretical possibility that Finch was a hired gun employing every
sexist stereotype at his disposal to destroy the complaining witness.
In reality, however, Mayella was not tortured (Emmett Till was tortured); she was simply cross-examined, vigorously but with courtesy
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1972, WisconsinMilwaukee.; J.D. 1975, Wisconsin. - Ed.
1. See STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETr TILL 20
(1980); Ronald Turner, Remembering Emmett Till, 38 How. L.J. 411, 417-20 (1995).
2. See Turner, supra note 1, at 415.
3. See MARY F. BERRY & JOHN W. BLAssii'AmE, LONG MEMORY: THE BLACK EXPrERIENCE N AMERICA 125 (1982).
4. See I GuNNAR MYRDAL, AN A mRicAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD.
ERN DEMOCRACY 560-61 (1944).

5. See Steven Lubet, ReconstructingAtticus Finch, 97 MiCr. L. REv. 1339, 1345 (1999).
6. See HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 215 (1960).
7. Lubet, supra note 5, at 1348.

1378

May 1999]

Responses

1379

and respect, in contrast to the prosecutor's racism-soaked crossexamination of Robinson.8 Although Mayella may have been embarrassed, she was quite feisty and combative on the stand. 9 Contrary to Lubet's protestations, her status, if any, in the community
was probably unaffected by the cross-examination.
Lubet postulates three alternative prisms through which to view
Finch's trial tactics: Robinson was truthful, Robinson was lying, or
Finch didn't know or care about the truth.10 As Lubet points out,
there was no medical evidence of rape, and Mayella's injuries were
inconsistent with Robinson's disability.1 ' Of course, under Lubet's
anything-is-possible theory, perhaps, the one-armed Robinson
could have held Mayella around the neck and choked her while
striking her in the face at the same time. Although Robinson is
married with three children, employed, churchgoing, clean-living,
and as respected as a black man could be by white people in that
era, Lubet's musings require a suspension of reality and a descent
into fantasy in order to raise questions of Finch's ethics. Nonetheless, despite Lubet's misapprehension and misinterpretation of the
facts required to complete the descent, the journey is still unsatisfactory even to Lubet himself, for he declares: "I do not sponsor
2
this version; I am not arguing that Tom Robinson was a rapist.'
Instead, Lubet posits that his third theory, Finch did not care
about the relative truth of the charge and defense, is the most likely
explanation for "dragg[ing] Mayella through the mud" and for what
Lubet catalogues as Finch's resort to a defense built on sexist stereotype, prejudice, and oppression of women.' 3 While some defense
lawyers may focus more on whether the state can prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of the "truth," Finch hardly
fits that category. He was a general practitioner, a state legislator,
and a lawyer who had avoided cases like this all his professional
life. The much more plausible scenario is that Finch believed his
client; if not, Finch probably would have expended his energies on
negotiating a sentence for Robinson in order to save him from the
8. The prosecutor, Mr. Gilmore, repeatedly referred to Robinson as "boy" or "a big

buck" and to other blacks as "nigger[s]." LEE, supra note 6, at 208-10. He invoked the
jurors' and courtroom observers' imbedded feelings of racial superiority by emphasizing

Tom's expression of pity for Mayella: "You felt sorry for her, you felt sorry for her?" Id. at
209. Mr. Gilmore then ended his cross-examination by reminding Robinson and the jury of

Robinson's subservient status, asking "[aire you being impudent to me, boy?" Id. at 210.
9. Mayella refused to answer many of Finch's questions and ultimately called the jury
"yellow stinkin' cowards." Id. at 200. Judge Taylor even overruled an objection by the prose-

cution during Mayella's cross-examination on the grounds that Finch was not browbeating
her: "If anything, the witness's browbeating Atticus." Id. at 198.
10. See Lubet, supra note 5, at 1345.
11. See id at 1346.
12. Id. at 1348.
13. See id. at 1349.
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electric chair. Finch was never optimistic about the jury verdict,
knowing that the all white14jury was incapable of accepting a black
man's testimony as truth.
But to indulge Lubet's fantasy, suppose Finch ignored the possibility that Tom was guilty and "rel[ied] upon cruel stereotypes, to
play the gender card.' u5 (I am not sure what Lubet thinks the "gender card" is, but I assume he refers to his list of "misconceptions
and fallacies about rape": fantasy, spite, shame, sexuality, and confusion.) 16 Was he ethical? Moral? Does the answer depend on
how you value human life? Does the answer pit black men against
white women or racism versus sexism? In the context of defending
someone facing the death penalty for rape, does it matter whether
the stereotype is true or false?
Here is what I think. In a society where approximately 1.6 mil17
lion people are incarcerated (a tripling in the past twenty years),
where one out of three young black men is under the control of the
criminal justice system,' where racism permeates the administration of criminal justice, and where black life is devalued, vigorous
and zealous advocacy is not an option but a requirement. Witnesses
(even rape complainants and the police) lie and are mistaken; the
United States Department of Justice recently reported more than
two dozen cases of innocent men convicted in sexual assault cases
but freed by DNA evidence.' 9 Just a few months ago, at Professor
Lubet's law school, a National Conference on Wrongful
Convictions and the Death Penalty revealed that seventy-four innocent people had been sentenced to death. 20 How many more innocent people are languishing in prison or on death row because their
lawyers were more concerned about the possibility of their guilt
rather than pursuing a vigorous and zealous defense? Moreover,
given the often inadequate level of representation provided to the
poor, Lubet's critique of Finch is, in my opinion, misguided. In an
era of racial profiling, prosecutorial overcharging, discriminatory
jury selection practices, disproportionate sentencing and confine14. See LEE, supra note 6, at 233.

15. Lubet, supra note 5, at 1362.
16. See id.
at 1351-53.
17. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPr. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 494 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1997).
18. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK
AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (1995).
19. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JUIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNO.

ENE AFTER TRIAL 12 (1996).
20. See Steve Chapman, 74 Problems with the Death Penalty, Cm. TRIm., Nov. 8, 1998, at
C23, available in LEXIS, News Library, CHTRIB File.
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ment policies, and wrongful convictions, vigilant and aggressive defense lawyers must be encouraged.
So, what do I think of Atticus Finch, "a paragon of honor or an
especially slick hired gun?" 21 He accepted a difficult and unpopular
case, saved his client from a lynch mob, and tried to do an effective
job in court. Did he harbor racist and sexist stereotypes? Yes, but
for a fifty-ish white man in 1930s small-town Alabama, he was probably ahead of the curve. Like most of us, he was a work in progress.

21. Lubet, supra note 5, at 1362.

